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PROBLEMS IN CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
THOMAS M. COOLEY, II t
Few lawyers find practical value in analyses of the rationale of
negligence or its branches; and in a sense this attitude of disinterest is
justified. The many and difficult essays upon negligence and its com-
plement, legal cause, can seldom be of more assistance in the winning
of a given litigation than the wordy searches for philosophical abso-
lutes in which the schoolmen are supposed to have reveled.
Nevertheless, in the lifetime of many lawyers practicing today
pressures arising within the judicial process have wrought consider-
able, if unacknowledged, alterations in the operation of certain aspects
of the common law negligence doctrine. Outside pressure has removed
from its sphere of operation certain problems typical of those which
are usually assigned to it for solution by practitioners and com-
mentators alike. And it is quite possible that there is a trend in this
latter direction which has not yet reached its fullest development. For
example: It is assumed without statistical research that the two greatest
sources of accidents which would ordinarily give rise to typical negli-
gence litigation are the industrial process and the automobile. Work-
men's Compensation and Employers' Liability Acts have now created
a system of compensating the injured party in accidents arising from
the first source which would appear almost wholly foreign to the jurists
who gave us the negligence doctrines we still use.1 Already there are
proposals that automobile accidents be similarly removed from the
operation of negligence law 2 even as it now stands, expanded and
distorted by the incorporation of multitudes of criminal statutes aimed
at diminishing the dangers of automobile operation.
3 The arguments
t A. B., 1932, University of Michigan; LL. B., 1935, Harvard University; In-
structor in Law, Western Reserve University Law School; author, What Constitutes
a Gift to a Class (1936) 49 HAav. L. REv.; contributor to various other legal period-icals.i. See generally as to the extent and nature of the deviation from common law
rules entailed in Workmen's Compensation Laws, Bohlen, A Problem in the Draft-
ing of Worknwiz's Compensation Acts (1912) 25 H~av. L. REV. 328; HARPER, ToRTs
(I933) §§ 207-215; and for a brief statement of the effect of federal employers' lia-
bility legislation, see Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence (932)
17 CORN. L. Q. 333, 359-363. See also, Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation
Acts (1914) 27 HARV. L. REv. 235.
2. Report of the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents to
the Columbia Research Committee for Research in the Social Sciences (1932) 138-
143. See, for a brief summary of the recommended plan, A Note on the Automobile
Accident Compensation Plan (1936) 3 LAw & CoNTMP. PROB. 579; cf. Van Buren
Perry, The Undte Process of Law (1937) 21 J. Am. Ju. SoC. 74, 75.
3. For an analysis of the impact of criminal statutes upon civil actions see
Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation (1932) 16 MINN. L. REV.
361; cf. Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability (933) 46 HARv.
L. REV. 453-
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of the proponents of this change are extremely difficult to answer,4
and, if the practical problems of economics and administration can be
solved satisfactorily,5 it seems possible that we shall ultimately see
negligence litigation cut off in large part from its second great source.6
Thus, in the two fields where negligence litigation has had its
most thorough testing and, perhaps, its widest development, it is either
largely superseded or subject to strenuous attack as a method of dis-
posing of the problems with which it is generally assumed to deal.
The practical significance of these changes wrought from without
the judicial system should require no emphasis. But they are ordinarily
treated as having no connection with the rationale of negligence. The
traditional view of its functions remains unchanged, and such de-
velopments are regarded as legislative exceptions which are interesting
enough in themselves, perhaps, but which necessitate no revision of
attitude towards the main problem. This is too comfortable a view.
These developments show, at the minimum, that the function attributed
to negligence litigation in traditional statements of its rationale is
broader than the facts of its operation now warrant. The purpose of
this paper is to outline a somewhat less ambitious rationale which
seems better fitted to the function the negligence doctrine now properly
fulfills and to examine some of its internal complexities from the
viewpoint so determined. For reasons which will appear during the
discussion, this examination of the growing alterations and complica-
tions within the judicial process will concern itself largely with con-
tributory negligence and some of its attendant doctrines. The practical
utility of such an analysis is that, if successful, it may not only promote
clearer understanding of what now exists, but also serve as a basis for
avoiding further unnecessary complications in and, possibly, ill-
4. There appears to be little disagreement as to the existing evils, for a study
of which see Report of Committee, note 2 supra. See also Corstvet, The Uncom-
pensated Accident and Its Consequences (1936) 3 LAw & CONTKIP. PROB. 466; Lewis,
The M[erits of the Automobile Compensation Plan (1936) 3 LAW & CONTEmP. PRoB.
583; Smith, Lilly and Dowling, Compensation for Automobile Accidents, a Symposium
(1932) 32 CoL. L. REV. 785, 803, 813. Compare, on the practical operation of the plan
suggested, Sherman, Comments on Report by the Committee to Study Compensation
for Automobile Accidents (Ass'n of Casualty and Surety Executives, N. Y. 1932).
5. There is at least serious doubt about this. For criticism and variant sug-
gestions, see Lilly, A Brief Statement of Certain Points in Opposition to Compulsory
Compensation Inturance for Motor Vehicle Accidents (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 756;
Melvin, Compulsory Compensation Automobile Insurance (1934) 6 N. Y. STATE BAR
Ass'N BuLL. 268. On this point, experience with the Massachusetts Compulsory In-
surance system [Mass. Laws 1925, c. 346, 3 MAss. ANN. LAws (1933) c. 90, §§ 34 (a)-
34 ()] has been widely discussed. See, generally, Blanchard, Compulsory Motor
Vehicle Liability Insurance in Massachusetts (1936) 3 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 537.
6. Inroads upon the operation of the common law doctrines are, of course, rep-
resented by such statutory provisions as the Massachusetts Compulsory Insurance
Act, note 5 supra; financial responsibility laws, as to which see generally, Braun, The
Financial Responsibility Law (1936) 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 505; guest acts, and
all criminal statutes applicable in civil litigation. But since these are purportedly
assimilated into negligence law as it now stands or are considered irrelevant to its
function, they are not important to the present argument.
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considered legislative and other attacks upon the negligence concept in
the field within which it properly operates.
I
The traditional rationale of negligence, worked out largely by
scholars, has had widespread appeal to courts and lawyers as well. The
notion that substantially all the problems arising from accidental in-
juries may be solved by reference to a single and apparently easily
comprehended legal formula is an attractive one. When able scholars
find doctrinal foundation for such a formula in absolutes of social
policy which preclude the possibility of altering its basic tenets, no
ordinary difficulties in its practical application are likely to disturb the
complacency with which the profession regards it. Thus, Professor
Bohlen's classic essay on contributory negligence 7 makes any other
doctrine unthinkable. To require one man to take better care of
others than such others are bound to take of themselves, 8 he states,
".. .would be to unduly burden business and enterprise, to
make of those engaged therein the guardians of those apt to be
affected by their operation, and at the same time to rob of self-
reliance, and so enervate and emasculate and in effect pauperize
the latter by accustoming them to look to others for protection
and br removing from them all responsibility for their own
safety." 9
Similar reasoning has supported the negligence doctrine itself.10
And the spectre of socialism has not infrequently appeared when alter-
natives were envisaged. 1
There are two immediate objections to this type of approach to
the problems of common law negligence litigation. The first is that
7. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, SELcrEn ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS
(1924) 469. Cf. Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N. E. 350 (1887).
8. This is not a necessary result of the elimination of contributory negligence.
The effect of the application of comparative negligence might be described as the
imposition of a duty on the defendant to take at least as good care of the plaintiff
as he takes of himself. Such verbal niceties are not, however, of prime importance
here for reasons to be discussed at length below.
9. Bohlen, note 7 supra at 490-491. Cf. Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of
Contributory Negligence, SELEcTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (924) 543, 549.
Cf. Pound, The Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts (i94o) 53 HAMv L.
REV. 365.
io. See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (930) 65-74, and authorities cited; Cowan,
The Victim of the Law of Torts (i939) 33 ILL. L. REv. 532 passim.
ii. "With a mechanistic philosphy as to human motives and a socialistic view-
point as to the function of the state, we may return to the original result of liability
for all injurious conduct, or conceivably have an absence of liability for any conduct,
with the burden of loss shifted either to groups of persons or to the entire com-
munity." Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective? (1927) 41 HARV. L. REV.
I, 28. No criticism is intended of this survey or of the conclusion reached. But
it is submitted that the relative "socialism" of the alternatives is irrelevant to their
accurate analysis.
338 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
there is at least grave doubt whether the outcome of isolated litigations
between individuals or groups has or ever had the assumed effects upon
the economic and ethical behaviour of the populace as a whole.' 2 The
second and far more serious objection is that, even assuming the
achievement of some effects upon community behaviour by either the
symbolic punishment of those whose conduct is thought to be sub-
standard or by indemnifying their victims,13 the courts, operating only
upon isolated adversary situations, are in no position to exercise a
sound and informed judgment upon public policy issues of this magni-
tude and scope. A dispute between A and B as to who is the more
properly to be held responsible for an accident is not the ideal setting
for contemplation of the merits and demerits of opposed views as to
the social consequences of accidents of that particular type and the
policies to be adopted in dealing with them on a large scale. No matter
how widespread the effects of great numbers of similar accidents may
be or how many diverse interests may be concerned, the court must
view each one as the source of controversy between A and B alone,
permitting consideration of all other affected interests to enter in, if at
all, solely as a function of something akin to judicial notice or judicial
predilection for certain social and economic views.14 Direct repre-
12. This doubt is widely shared by commentators. See Leflar, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tortleasors (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 130, 132-139; Lowndes,
Contributory Negligence (934) 22 GEo. L. J. 674, 682; Mole and Wilson, note I
supra at 644-645.
13. That the element of punishment enters into the ordinary tort case seems
clear. This is generally admitted in the cases where defendant's conduct has been
wilful. See Bohlen, note 7 supra at 491-492. But it is difficult to agree that those
cases mark the limits of the area in which retribution for social wrong is partially
determinative of the tort rules. Contrast the statement, "The modern tort recog-
nizing and enforcing social duties is in all its features purely compensatory." Ibid.
In the first place, while negligence law does not permit purely punitive damages as
such, juries probably vary the amounts awarded for similar injuries in direct propor-
tion to the stimulus afforded their retributive feelings by the conduct of the defendant.
Certainly all plaintiffs' lawyers shape their arguments upon this supposition. And
the limits of appellate review are broad enough to permit this factor to have a
considerable effect in the outcome. Moreover, the very fact that social policy is so
often cited as a determining factor in the formulation of negligence rules is an admis-
sion of the same tendency on the part of judges. Whenever A is made to pay money
because what he has done violates some social policy, that payment can no longer
properly be said to be "purely" compensatory, even if he pays it in an amount deter-
mined by the extent of B's injury and pays it to B. To be sure, B gets no additional
money because of A's badness. But A pays in part because of his social transgres-
sion. The very prevalence of the words "fault", "blame" and "wrong" in judicial
and other discussions of negligence law likewise indicate something other than a
simple compensatory system. And legal cause itself is clearly a method of limiting
defendant's duty of compensation in accordance with considerations some of which
are irrelevant either to the extent of plaintiff's injury or defendant's factual partici-
pation in its occurrence. See generally, Cowan, note io supra. Cf. Isaacs, Fault and
Liability (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 954.
As to the extent to which isolated litigations may be supposed to affect society
generally see ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935), and ARNoL, SYMBoLs OF
GOVERNMENT (1935).
14. See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (I88I) 35-36. In the field of constitutional
law, the importation of the economic and social predilections of the judges into the
terms of the fundamental charter has long been the subject of heated debate. See
Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Lochner v. New York, i98 U. S. 45, 75 (I9o5)
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sentation of any interests other than those of the immediate participants
is precluded by the very form and purpose of the inquiry and would be
inappropriate in any event since the broader effects of given types of
accident are not usually determinable from any single instance. If it
is true, as the proponents of remedial legislation contend, that uncom-
pensated injuries resulting from automobile operation are the source
of serious burdens upon the community which could be avoided by
some sort of community action,' 5 a tort case is not the place either to
discover that fact or to seek remedies for it.16 In short, wherever the
assumptions of the individualist philosophy implicit-and explicit-in
negligence cases are challenged, it becomes impossible for the courts
to decide the resulting policy issue with the requisite facilities for
informed judgment.
It will be observed that the above argument applies to all negli-
gence cases, although only those which occur in large numbers and
possess certain common characteristics are used for illustration. It is
true that the courts lack facilities for the informed determination of
explicit social policy with respect to such problems as that presented in
Brown v. Kendall 17 quite as much as they do with respect to those
occurring in the cases now governed largely by workmen's compensa-
tion laws. Nevertheless, social thought has not yet reached the point
and compare the view of the present court in Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53, 62 (1939) ;
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 453-454 (1938). It is less generally recognized that
the process by which such views are incorporated into the generalities of common law
doctrine is precisely the same as that by which the broader generalizations of the
constitution are made to express them. The effects are, of course, different. Con-
stitutional interpretation may preclude legislative change, while rigidification of com-
mon law doctrine may simply invite it. The distinction between the gradual devel-
opment of standards, to which Holmes refers as a proper legislative function of the
judiciary, must be carefully distinguished from the explicit importation of rigid social
philosophies, which he denounces.
15. See authorities cited in notes 2 and 4 supra. The premise, of course, is one
which an extreme individualistic philosophy denies altogether.
6. The only judicial alternative to some sort of distribution of loss based on
fault would seem to be imposition of absolute liability, In general, however, that
is an unsatisfactory solution. It partially achieves the same result as legislation
which shifts the burden of loss to some selected group. But the method of selection
is haphazard in the extreme. Furthermore, the courts lack power to make certain
that the loss will be spread among the group by insurance or some similar device.
They also lack facilities for discovering whether, even assuming that all prospective
defendants will insure, the economic burden will be excessive. Accordingly, when
absolute liability is imposed by common law there is a strong possibility that eco-
nomic difficulties will ensue, that some defendants will not insure and, in conse-
quence, some of them may be pauperized while some plaintiffs will go without the
compensation the rule was intended to give. Finally, not only may the imposition
of absolute liability thus fall substantially short of its object and even be positively
harmful, but it runs the risk of meeting hostile popular reaction. Careful legislative
action, on the other hand, may avoid all of these difficulties; and it therefore seems
preferable in any case where distribution of loss on some basis of fault has become
inadequate.
Note, however, the conclusion that there is a steady erosion of fault as the sole
ground for shifting loss to the defendant in automobile cases. Nixon, Changing
Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation (1936) 3 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 476.
17. 6o Mass. 292 (i85o).
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where the more isolated types of accident are regarded as presenting
any social problem of general significance, and no machinery has yet
been suggested for taking care of them by any means other than the
typical adversary legal proceeding.18 Accordingly, we may expect that
the great mass of such problems will continue to be handled by the
familiar legal techniques. Where the size and common characteristics
of the problems raised by a given type of accident have not yet made it
a subject of active and direct community concern, there is as yet nothing
to create an articulate conflict of social policies with respect to the
method of disposing of it.
In such cases the only policy which really demands attention is
that which requires the solution of individual controversies according
to some generally acceptable system of rules. The search for absolutes
of social philosophy is irrelevant. Of course, the "instinctive prefer-
ences and inarticulate convictions" 19 of judges and their views of
"what is expedient for the community concerned" 20 will and should
guide them in the task of developing rules which comport with the
general ideas of fairness of the community in which they sit. To the
extent that the rules do prove acceptable, they will prevent other
methods of solution less orderly than the use of legal processes from
being condoned. But to make these instinctive preferences, convictions
and views explicit and to identify them with rigid philosophical systems
is to risk the possibility that they will fail of their purpose.
2 1 Com-
munities have a way of changing faster than their stated philosophies
admit.
If the pretensions of the law of negligence had been consciously
limited to the function thus marked out by the very nature of the
adversary system of litigation of which it is a part, many of its more
difficult problems might have been avoided. There are abundant signs
within the judicial process that the rules worked out by courts and
writers who have approached ad hoc situations with their eyes firmly
I8. It is quite possible, as Professor Seavey suggests in the excerpt quoted note
ii supra, that changes in social viewpoint may ultimately result in shifting losses
from all accidental injuries to selected groups or to the state. It is enough for pres-
ent purposes to say that currently there is no demand for such a solution for the
great mass of isolated tort litigations, although state care of paupers may be viewed
as achieving a partial approach to the latter result in certain extreme cases.
i9. HoraMEs, op. cit. supra note 14 at 36.
20. Id. at 35.
21. This argument does not deny the validity of the view that standards of con-
duct must be of general applicability and capable of general understanding. Id. at
Iro-iii. Some of the less restrained modem criticisms of the operation of the
Anglo-American legal system-see e. g. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) ;
RoDELL, WOE UNTO You LAWYERS! (1939), seem to suggest that all generalized
legal rules are wrong in and of themselves; but it seems apparent that, whatever
their demerits as viewed from a perfectionist standpoint, they reflect a very real
demand on the part of those to whom they apply. It is difficult to believe that there
would be popular acceptance of a legal system in which each case was treated as
unique and decided without reference to any generally applicable formula.
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fixed on philosophical abstractions are not working well, even as
applied to the problems whose characteristics do not bring them forcibly
to public attention. To predict that this situation will produce popular
revolt would be, of course, to fall into the error implicit in views
already criticized. The populace is not so sensitive to the workings of
the judicial process. But the judicial process itself may be. Judges
and juries react to unfair results in individual cases, and their struggles
to avoid such results will inevitably confound confusion the more if
accompanied by a sincere belief that the doctrines responsible for the
difficulty are indispensable to the maintenance of our whole social
order. And eventually, growing confusion in the workings of tort law
might lead to the necessity of reform from without.
The indications that present rules are not working well even
within the field of relatively isolated types of accident are numerous.
They comprise scholarly dissections of the theory of negligence itself,
covert judicial attacks upon certain aspects of its operation such as
that implicit in the development of the last clear chance doctrine, and
direct legislative onslaughts and revolts on the part of juries in what
is probably a significant number of cases.
Although these evidences might be otherwise construed, it is be-
lieved they point to no fundamental defect in the negligence concept
itself. The idea that a deviation from ordinary prudence is a pre-
requisite for shifting to the actor the loss resulting to another from
his conduct seems generally satisfactory for the purposes it properly
serves.
The question has been raised by its critics why one should be
permitted to injure his neighbor without being forced to bear the
resulting loss merely because the injury results from a course of con-
duct regarded as prudent.22  This, to the social philosopher, is an ex-
tremely interesting and difficult question. He may well puzzle over
why such a situation is generally condoned. It is enough for the judge
if he is sure that it is; and there is danger in any attempt on his part
to formulate philosophical explanations and incorporate them into legal
rules. If his explanations are correct, it is doubtful how much effect
they have on popular thinking.23 If they are wrong, they may well
aid in rigidifying a rule which, while based on accurate observation
at the time, subsequently becomes useless or positively harmful to the
22. See Cowan, note 1o supra at 541: "Why should the injured party be forced
to absolve a non-negligent individual who has harmed him? Let the state foot the
bill if it wants to encourage this kind of right-minded but harmful conduct." It
might be added that justification of the accident-preventing function of tort liability.
if it actually has any, is also difficult. The fairness of making A pay money to X
so that B and C will be more careful in the future, thus benefitting society, seems
questionable. Cf. Schofield note 9 supra at 550.
23. See note 13 supra.
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effective solution of the problems to which it is to be applied. The
sufficient reason for this basic rule of negligence seems to be that the
prevalent popular conceptions of justice and causation are in accord
with it. Whether for economic, ethical, or other reasons, activity is
generally accepted as the normal state of affairs, and only such types
of activity as seem exceptionally and unjustifiably dangerous are
thought to require the shifting of loss to the actor when harm re-
sults. 24 No analysis of the underlying psychological or other reasons
for this state of mind is either necessary or useful in predicating upon
it rules of law the function of which is solution of controversies in a
society which entertains it.
A somewhat similar answer may be made to critics of the evident
crudity of the standards worked out under the heading of negligence.
If the function of the concept is, as suggested, simply to provide a
lubricant for the frictions caused by accidents occurring in a highly
complex society, it must do so by the application of relatively rough
and ready standards. In the first place, the acceptability of the results
obtained will be largely determined not by accurate criticism based on
scientific grounds, but by a necessarily nebulous popular concept of
fairness. 25 Whether or not the intellect approves this situation, it is
dictated by a number of factors which seem unavoidably to lead to it.
The human limitations--qualitative and quantitative----on the capacities
of judges and juries preclude the detailed scientific analysis of many
of the matters which psychologists would consider essential to the
determination of "fault" in any situation, even assuming the existence
of the term as a valid scientific tool. 26  Still more does "cause" present
scientific and logical questions which baffle the highest types of special-
ized minds.2  Even if judges and juries were or should become com-
petent to handle such matters, the limits of the evidentiary system
would either preclude the necessary proof or expand the simplest tort
litigations to a point where sheer bulk might shortly bring the entire
court system to a halt. Finally, if these substantial hurdles were
cleared, it is altogether probable that the resulting adjudications would
24. The legal commentator may, of course, be much interested in this question.
HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 14 passim; Ames, Law and Morals, SEEcTEI ESSAYS
ON THE LAW or TORTS (1924) I; Cowan, note io supra at 541 et seq.; Lowndes,
note 12 supra at 688.
25. See for an excellent analysis of the correspondence of the negligence stand-
ards to this concept, Seavey, note ii supra.
26. Id. n. 2, with which compare ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 13 passim.
27. See Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Succeeding Cause (i937) 86 U. OF PA.
L. Rzv. 121, 121-123. Cf. Cowan, note IO supra at 536-539. Of course, the whole
problem of legal causation is here involved, but extensive citation of authority on
this point would seem a work of supererogation. Reference may be made to the
classic essays by Beale, Bohlen, Green, McLaughlin and Jeremiah Smith which are
familiar to every student of the subject, and also to a recent article, Morris, On the
Teaching of Legal Cause (i939) 39 COL. L. REv. io87. Cf. Cowan, The Riddle of
the Palsgraf Case (938) 23 MINN. L. REV. 46.
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fail to satisfy current popular standards of fairness and thus would
be quite likely to fall short of their stated objective. 28
Accordingly, the amorphosity of the "ordinary prudence" stand-
ard, altered somewhat, if not alleviated, by the haphazard acknowledg-
ment of certain more specific factors such as purported expertness in
some callings, obvious "physical" handicaps, and the like,29 should
probably not be too heavily criticized. Neither philosophy nor science
can approve it, but it apparently satisfies the instinctive demands of
the unscientific and non-philosophical; and that is what it is for.
The real source of dissatisfaction with negligence litigation must
be sought elsewhere. If the notion of shifting loss in accident cases
to such defendants only as are found to have acted with less than
ordinary prudence finds general acceptance, what is responsible for
the strains within the process that clearly show on the surface? The
answer seems to lie in the response to the rules of contributory negli-
gence as they are now--or purport to be-applied. When any of the
published attacks on the doctrine are analyzed or when the foci of
confusion surrounding it within the judicial system are studied, the
contributory negligence doctrine inevitably appears as a major source
of difficulty.
A brief listing and examination of the indicia of discontent with
contributory negligence80 should suffice to show both the source of
difficulty and the nature of the only solution which, in the light of
what has been said above concerning the function of negligence law
generally, seems promising.
ii
The basic proposition of contributory negligence, that a plaintiff
who is negligent in the slightest degree cannot recover from a de-
28. The difficulty which modern penologists and criminologists have met in
attempting to change the popular views of criminal justice may be indicative of the
likely reaction to such a change in the civil rules. The more so because there seems
to be little doubt that moral indignation affects the popular standards of fairness in
civil cases as much, probably, as do economic and other social preconceptions. See
Lowndes, note 12 supra at 688. See also note 13 supra.
29. See for general discussion of the nature and scope of the rules by which ordi-
nary prudence is particularized in the attempt to make it reflect some more obvious
types of special capacity or incapacity; Seavey, note 1o supra.
3o. The historical and purely logical problems have been covered elsewhere.
Bohlen's thesis that the absence of challenge to contributory negligence when it was
first announced indicates its strong historical roots (Bohlen, note 7 supra at 469-470)
seems adequately answered by the argument in Maclntyre, The Rationale of Last
Clear Chance (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 1125, 1127-1232 that, at its inception, the doc-
trine was not thought of as being as stringent as it later became. Similarly, the
frailty of the doctrine on logical grounds is covered at length in Lowndes, note 12
supra. See also Cowan, note IO supra. It is intended here simply to show the prac-
tical difficulties in application of a doctrine the logical and historical frailties of
which are brought sharply to focus by the inherent injustices of its operation. Ex-
tensive citation of cases upon all the branches of last clear chance will be found in
Note (1934) 92 A. L. R. 47-150.
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fendant who is guilty of nothing worse than negligence in no matter
what degree, now passes without direct judicial challenge. Perhaps
the plainest indication of dissatisfaction with it is one which is not
subject to exact proof. The tendency of juries to reach compromise
verdicts in cases where the defense is invoked to bar a plaintiff whose
conduct seems to them less reprehensible than that of the defendant a'
has been remarked. 2 Little more can be said other than to point out
that to whatever extent the tendency does exist, it marks a failure of
the doctrine, pro tanto, to satisfy the popular conceptions of fairness
insofar as one can assume that jury verdicts reflect those conceptions.
3 3
The doctrine of last clear chance has developed in a manner
which plainly suggests a similar reaction on the part of judges. Judicial
discontent with the idea that a negligent plaintiff may recover nothing
from a defendant whose conduct seems the more tinged with fault 3'
has found expression in a doctrine which presents analytical difficulties
characteristic of situations in which settled but distasteful rules are
being covertly avoided. Demonstration of this attribute requires a
rather detailed examination of the various categories in which the
doctrine appears.
The easiest case is the first variety of so-called "conscious last clear
chance". Here the plaintiff has negligently exposed himself to injury
and has become helpless to prevent it. Subsequently the defendant
becomes conscious of the danger and fails to avert injury although
capable of doing so.3- Liability is imposed upon the defendant because,
it is said, plaintiff's negligence is not a proximate cause of the accident,
having been isolated by his helplessness and defendant's subsequent
negligence.3 6 This is plainly mere assertion. In the first place, all dis-
tinctions between causes as proximate and non-proximate are subject to
31. It is doubtful to what extent this result is reached where the plaintiff appears
to be the more responsible for the accident, although still not solely so.
32. Lowndes, note 12 sufra at 674.
33. As to the differing functions of judge and jury with respect to the applica-
tion of those conceptions, see Eldredge, note 27 supra at 121-123. Cf. HOLMES, op. cit.
supra note 14 at 122-124.
34. See generally Maclntyre, note 3o supra; Note (1934) 92 A. L. R. 47.
35. These are, of course, the "discovered peril" cases. Cf. Johnson v. Stewart,
62 Ark. 164, 34 S. W. 889 (1896); Provo v. Spokane etc. R. R., 87 Ore. 467, 170
Pac. 522 (1918). The segregation of these cases from other "conscious last clear
chance" situations has now been approved by the Restatement. RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(1934) § 479.
36. Analogy to reckless or wanton misconduct cases seems inexact. HARPER,
TORTS (1933) § 138. Realization of peril does not normally make an actor's conduct
reckless and wanton unless he simply fails to act. If he acts in a sub-standard man-
ner, this ordinarily is regarded as simple negligence just as is failure to realize peril.
Clearly the requisite "indifference to consequences" [Atchison T. etc. Ry. v. Baker,
79 Kan. 183, 98 Pac. 804 (i9o8)] does not invariably exist in this situation, although,
of course, it may. Contrast, however, the treatment of last clear chance cases as
questions of "gross negligence" in some jurisdictions. See e. g. Denman v. Johnston,
85 Mich. 387, 48 N. W. 565 (1891); Cox v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 331 Mo. 910,
55 S. W. (2d) 685 (1932).
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suspicion of being simply conclusions which result from inarticulate
judgments of practical politics.37 Secondly, this particular treatment
of causation is at variance with standard practice. It is not ordinarily
said that mere inability to avert the consequences of an act, once per-
formed, keeps that act from "causing" injury. Nor is the time factor
normally of prime significance. 38 A sufficient demonstration of this is
found in the case where A, who had a last clear chance, and B, whose
negligence is "at rest", collide and injure C. There seems to be no
doubt that both should be liable to C,39 assuming, of course, that plain-
tiff, B, was negligent with respect to C as well as himself. Hence the
basis of last clear chance is plainly a comparison of the respective faults
of A and B for the purpose of settling their controversy only and is
not a doctrine concerned solely with the theoretically external problem
of cause.
But there is no apparent need to complain of the result. In most
cases, it seems more satisfactory than leaving the plaintiff to bear the
loss. 40 The same may be said of the second variety of conscious last
clear chance, where the only difference is that the defendant observes,
but does not comprehend the danger of, the plaintiff's plight. In either
37. See Andrews, J. dissenting in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339,
162 N. E. 99 (1928). Again, specific reference to the welter of cases and articles
on legal cause will be omitted; but it seems safe to say that nowhere in the doctrine
of proximate cause is there any specific criterion to be found which will require the
classification of plaintiff's negligence as non-proximate here. The same problem has
been the subject of difficulty where a defendant seeks to be discharged of all or part
of his liability because of the intervention of some other culpable act between his and
the injury. And it has been recognized in such cases that the judgment of relative
culpability of the actors is the decisive factor in applying the conclusion as to causa-
tion. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 447-449; Eldredge, note 27 supra at 123-124.
38. The time factor itself is not free from suspicion of artificiality. It is, of
course, reduced to absurdity in the cases following the so-called "Humanitarian Rule".
See Note (1932) 92 A. L. R. 47, 128 et seq. But in the typical cases, if nothing but the
acts of the parties were considered, it would frequently appear that continuing inac-
tion on the part of both was the source of the accident. Analysis must then be shifted
to the duty issue. Plaintiff's failure to act with care violates his duty to do so at
the time when it gets him inextricably in trouble. Defendant's continuous failure to
act violates his duty at a later time. This is not because he acted later, but because
it is determined that his duty arose later. Thus, the time factor does not concern
acts but duties. This is explicit in the "unconscious last clear chance" cases, where
action is in fact impossible owing to a failure to fulfill the duty of observation. But
the defendant does not have a last clear chance because he has a later duty. He has
a later duty because he has a last clear chance. The circle seems complete. For
the final contradiction resulting from this confusion of action and duty, see infra, p. 347.
39. Nashua Iron & Steel Co. v. Worcester, etc. R. R., 62 N. H. 159 (1882).
There is some question whether the extreme confusion surrounding joinder, contri-
bution and indemnity questions between tortfeasors has not made a different doctrine
possible in Ohio. Cf. Herron v. Youngstown, 136 Ohio St. 190, 24 N. E. (2d) 7o8
(194o) ; Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183, 24 N. E. (2d) 705 (1940); Kneiss v.
Armour & Co., 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N, E. (2d) 734 (940); and see Notes on these
cases, (I939) I5 OHIO 0. 477, and (1940) I7 OHIO 0. 37. Cf. Bohlen, note 7 .rpra
at 479, n. I and Leflar, note 12 supra at 151-154. But it would seem wholly incon-
gruous with the generally accepted rule as to intervening wrongdoers. See RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS (1934) §§447-449. See also Eldredge, note 27 supra, passin, and
conclusions stated at 133-135. Cf. Bohlen, note 7 supra at 494-495. A leading case
is Lane v. Atlantic Waterworks Co., III Mass. 136 (1872).
4o. The prevalence of railroad-crossing accident cases among those adopting the
rule may have something to do with the appeal of the plaintiff's situation.
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case the defendant's relevant conduct seems the more at fault 41 because
the circumstances in which it took place probably contained a more
immediate and certain threat of danger than did those in which plaintiff
acted. It is purely coincidental that the time element enters here. The
defendant is held liable not because he acted later but because he was
more at fault. It is quite possible to imagine cases where the later act
is the less reprehensible. 42  The unconscious last clear chance doctrine,
as ordinarily applied, 43 offers little more difficulty. That the defendant
did not observe the danger seems to offer no better excuse than does his
failure to comprehend what he observed. But, again, it is not the time
of his action 44 but the circumstances which are important.
Two final situations are more troublesome. Suppose the defend-
ant, before the plaintiff's helplessness has set in, has negligently rendered
himself incapable of observation, 45 or of action.46  Will he be excused
in either case because he became helpless first? Any proper solution of
this question would seem to require either an affirmative answer on the
ground that the parties are now equal, or an examination of the relative
imminence and quality of the danger created by the substandard conduct
of each party in the attempt to ascertain the greater fault.
The answer given by the Restatement,47 and by a number of
courts,48 however, is quite different. The defendant who rendered
himself incapable of action goes free. The one whose antecedent care-
lessness precluded observation is liable. This distinction has been justi-
41. In the latter case, his failure to act is chargeable to stupidity rather than
faulty coordination or indifference. But stupidity has always been considered blame-
worthy under the partially objective standard of negligence. See Seavey, note ii
supra at 12-13. And if so much can be done, no reason appears for not imputing
more or less blame according to the obviousness of the danger with which the de-
fendant is confronted.
42. This seems plainly to be the situation in British Columbia etc. Ry. v. Loach
[i916] 1 A. C. 719 (P. C. I915). The result there obtained might have been reached
by characterizing the conduct of the defendant as wanton or reckless, of course, as
was done in Banks v. Braman, i88 Mass. 367, 74 N. E. 594 (i9o5) and in the juris-
dictions where "gross negligence" is used to describe last clear chance situations. But
the requirement of indifference to consequences seems excessive; and, in any event,
the refusal to permit the defense of contributory negligence to any higher degree of
wrongdoing is scarcely less confused than the last clear chance doctrine itself.
43. See HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 138 and RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 479. An
extensive collection of cases may be found in Note (193) 92 A. L. R. 47, 101-128.
A leading case is Teakle v. San Pedro L. A. etc. R. R., 32 Utah 276, go Pac. 402 (907).
44. As already noted, note 38 mupra, action or inaction alone is here incapable
of being related to time. Only by relating time to the slippery duty issue can this
result be achieved under orthodox doctrine.
45. Lloyd v. Albermarle R. R., 118 N. C. 1010, 24 S. E. 805 (i88) ; Dent v.
Bellows Falls & Street Ry., 95 Vt. 523, I16 Atl. 83 (1922).
46. British Columbia Elec. Ry. v. Loach, [1916] 1 A. C. 719 (P. C. 1915).
47. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 479, comment f. Cf. WINFIELD, THE LAW OF
TORT, (I937) 443-446.
48. See notes 45, 46, supra. Compare with the Loach case, Boston & Me. R. R.
v. McDuffey, 79 Fed. 934 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897); Trigg v. Water, Light, etc. Co., 215
Mo. 521, 114 S. W. 972 (19o8). But cf. Labarge v. Pere Marquette R. R., 134 Mich.
139, 95 N. W. lO73 (1903). See generally HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 139. Cf. WIN-
FIELD, THE LAW OF TORT (1937) 443-446.
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fled on the grounds that in the case where power to act is precluded,
there is, in the interim of plaintiff's helplessness, no last clear chance,
observed or otherwise. The defendant is unable by the exercise of care
during that time to act so as to avoid the injury. On the other hand,
the unconscious last clear chance cases demonstrate that there is a duty
to observe which arises in the interim. If that duty were fulfilled in
the cases where the power to observe is precluded, action to avoid the
injury would be possible. Hence defendant, in violation of duty, has
failed to utilize a last clear chance.49
This distinction seems wholly inadequate. Its only justification
lies in the duty issue borrowed from the unconscious clear chance cases.
It overlooks the fact that the duty of observation in those cases is pos-
sible of fulfillment at the time when it is said to arise. It is an exact
parallel to the defendant's duty to act in all other last clear chance cases.
The plaintiff's duty to act in each case is excused during the interim
of his helplessness because of impossibility, while defendant's is not
because his is not impossible during that time. But in this last case for
the first time the plaintiff's failure to perform his duty is excused
despite the fact that the defendant's duty is equally impossible of ful-
fillment. The only possible basis for such a distinction is the belief
that a duty to observe is somehow more strict than a duty to act.50
That is in the last analysis a question of comparative fault. But nothing
in the distinction suggests any reason for finding less fault in an ante-
cedent negligence which precludes action with respect to observed
helpless plaintiffs than in one which prevents their observation. It is
quite possible that, on the facts of the cases in which the problems
arise, the fault of the defendant would seem greater than that of the
plaintiff in either situation. Sending out vehicles capable of great
destruction either without headlights 5' or without brakes 52 is a highly
dangerous proceeding. But the distinction postulated between observ-
vation and action is not one which appeals to any of the instinctive
categories of fairness.53
Accordingly, the last clear chance doctrine appears as an effort to
inject a comparative fault element into contributory negligence by
making the time element the predominant factor in the proximate cause
49. See HARPER, TORTS (1933) § '39. Cf. Lowndes, note 12 mupra at 706-708.
5o. To say that there is a duty to observe a last clear chance is simply a circular
verbalism. It supposes that ability to act to avoid injury is the sole criterion. It is
not. Where observation is absent, ability to act is precluded. Yet, properly, where
observation is possible and could revive the ability to act, its absence does not excuse
the defendant. If where it is impossible to observe, the duty continues, it is clear
that this is a duty which differs from any other imposed on either plaintiff or de-
fendant.
51. Dent v. Bellows Falls & St. Ry., 95 Vt. 523, 1I6 Atl. 83 (1922).
52. British Columbia Elec. Ry. v. Loach, [i9i6] i A. C. 719 (P. C. 1915).
53. ". . . it is doubtful whether it is either good policy or good sense." Lowndes,
note 12 supra at 708.
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issue raised. In most of the cases in which it is used, this device
achieves its end in a more or less satisfactory manner. It also achieves
a wholly unwarranted amount of complexity and confusion, and in
some of the peripheral cases it seems to operate in a plainly irrational
way to bring about highly questionable results.
A similar situation exists with respect to the explicit limitations
upon the operation of contributory negligence. These may be summed
up by the statement that contributory negligence is a defense only to
actions based on negligence. 54  The source of such a rule is probably
to be found in a rudimentary recognition of comparative fault. But
its operation does not tend uniformly toward that result. One reason
it does not is that, as in the case of last clear chance, the fact that com-
parative fault is forbidden by orthodox doctrine has necessitated the
formulation of particularized rules for various aspects of its application
which confess no allegiance to that concept.
The most generally approved and easily explained application of
the rule is the one which refuses to permit the defense of contributory
negligence to that class of injuries which result from conduct charac-
terized as wilfulness, wantonness, recklessness, or, in some jurisdictions,
gross negligence. To the argument that this is clearly based on compar-
ative fault,55 the orthodox answer is that the faults involved differ not
in degree alone, but in kind.56 Such a position is difficult to support.
The necessary, albeit difficult, avoidance of the subjective element in
the ascertainment even of intent means that, in part at least, intention-
ality and negligence merely mark degrees in an objective standard of
conduct. This is, of course, no reason for objecting to demarcation
of the degrees and differentiation in their treatment. Indeed, it seems
quite probable that the segregation of "intentional" injuries from those
to which plaintiff's inadvertence is a defense accords almost exactly
with the results which would be obtained by permitting direct compari-
son of the respective faults of the parties. 57 Thus this special limitation
upon contributory negligence can be said to be no worse than useless
and probably not the source of any substantial confusion.
Less innocuous are the terms wanton and reckless. They mark
lesser degrees of departure from the standard of conduct, and the treat-
54. Muller v. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195 (1818).
55. See HARPz, TORTS (1933) § 150, 151. Cf. Gibbard v. Cursan, 225 Mich. 311,
196 N. W. 398 (1923) where both parties are guilty of reckless conduct.
56. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Baker, 79 Kan. 183, 98 Pac. 804 (i9o8) ; Banks
v. Braman, 188 Mass. 367, 74 N. E. 594 (19o).
57. The moral indignation which it is the function of the word "intentional" to
evoke characteristically has this result. The logical irrelevance of this factor to a
purely compensatory scheme is ably stated in Lowndes, note 12 Mrpra at 688. Never-
theless, as is also stated there, it is a firmly established part of the popular feeling
of fairness, and attempts to curb its more deeply rooted manifestations are almost
certainly foredoomed.
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ment accorded them in refusing to allow the plaintiff's negligence as a
defense probably achieves a result not greatly different from that to be
expected from an admitted use of comparative fault in the easier cases
which approach intentionality. Clarity disappears in the less obvious
situations, however. At this point appears the real difficulty which
results from rigid classification. Refinement must stop somewhere or
breed confusion of its own. Recognition of this fact has been the chief
reason for refusal to subdivide negligence itself. Accordingly, the
comparison of fault, even under the thin disguise of epithetical categor-
ization, has traditionally been forbidden beyond this point.5 s The
resulting contradictions in judicial analysis and the very mass of litiga-
tion which has piled up at the boundary drawn here indicate that it is
not a satisfactory one.59 The inevitable difficulty of defining a matter
of degree in absolute terms will not explain them. That difficulty is
41 present in numerous other situations in the law without producing so
58. This taboo has evoked learned dispute. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Raym. Ld. 909,
91 Eng. Rep. R. 1, 13 (1703) made one of the most striking attempts at further
classification. That decision was attributed to a leaning toward Roman Law in
WHARTON, NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 1878) §§ 59-63; cf. New World v. King, 16 How.
469 (U. S. 1853); THOmPSON, NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 19oi) § 18 takes issue with the
validity of this explanation. And the attempt has been briskly condemned in subse-
quent cases. See e. g. Baron Rolfe in Wilson v. Brett, 1i M. & W. II3, 152 Eng.
Rep. R. 737 (1843); HARPER, ToRTs (1933) § 74 and authorities cited.
59. Adequate compilation and analysis of the cases upon this point would require
a sizeable volume. Two full pages of citation in Corpts Juris are devoted to cases
in which may be found every variety of emphatic reiteration of the statement that
wilfulness and wantonness are entirely, utterly, wholly and otherwise absolutely dis-
tinct from negligence. 45 C. J. 671-674. A rather extensive effort to reconcile the
cases has convinced the writer that the judiciary is protesting too much. See e. g.
Peavey v. Peavey, 36 Ga. App. 202, 136 S. E. 96 (1926) (Guest Act); Adamowicz
v. Newburyport Gas Co., 238 Mass. 244, 13o N. E. 388 (1921); cf. Young v. Wor-
cester, 253 Mass. 481, 149 N. E. 204 (1925). A similar amount of space is occupied
by cases which alternately define gross negligence, deny its existence and identify it
with or distinguish it from wantonness and wilfulness. See 45 C. J. 667-671. A
smaller, but substantial number is cited for the proposition that mere gross negligence
does not preclude the defense of contributory negligence; while the qualification is
made that this is not true where gross negligence and wilfulness or wantonness are
synonymous. See 45 C. J. 982-983. Consultation of the various digest systems re-
veals this situation even more clearly through the medium of more extensive quota-
tion. Decisive proof of the mass of contradictions in this material would require,
of course, analysis of the facts of the cases cited and demonstration that the distinc-
tions drawn become meaningless in that process. This the writer has done in part
by sampling; but for present purposes, only a few of the cases from a single juris-
diction need be cited, and factual analysis will be left to such readers as are curious
to see the results in a theoretically coherent body of law. Michigan's supreme court
has made the following statements, among others, on the points mentioned: gross neg-
ligence is negligence of an aggravated character, Buxton v. Ainsworth, 138 Mich. 532,
1OI N. W. 817 (1904). It implies thoughtless disregard, Simon v. Detroit U. Ry.,
196 Mich. 586, 162 N. W. 1012 (1917). It imports wilfulness, Finnegan v. Mich-
igan Central R. R., 127 Mich. 15, 86 N. W. 395 (19O1). Also wantonness, Denman
v. Johnston, 85 Mich. 387, 48 N. W. 565 (1891). But, accurately speaking, negligence
and wilfulness are incompatible terms, as are negligence and wantonness, Union Trust
Co. v. Detroit U. Ry., 239 Mich. 97, 214 N. W. 166 (1927). And degrees of negli-
gence are not recognized, Finkler v. Zimmer, 258 Mich. 336, 241 N. W. 851 (1932).
Gross negligence, however, does not preclude the defense of contributory negligence,
Gibbard v. Cursan, 225 Mich. 311, 196 N. W. 398 (1923). But where the term is
used to mean wilful or wanton, it does, Patton v. Grand Trunk & Ry., 236 Mich. 173,
21o N. V. 309 (1926) ; and the same is true where it is used to describe the conduct
of a defendant who, it appears, had a last clear chance, Denman v. Johnston, supra.
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striking a result. Here dissatisfaction is focused upon the boundary
itself, not the definition of it, and there is a marked tendency to hurdle
it and carry categorization from this point on down into the theoret-
ically unitary area of negligence. Thus gross negligence is today much
more respectable than formerly.60 Other terms indicating variations in
degree of fault are progressively losing what once appeared to be sharp
contours-a process greatly accelerated by their use in guest cases.,'
It can be argued with reason that these trends are not for the
better. Refinements of category still foster confusion, no matter how
legitimate their object. At some point that confusion may become
more obstructive to the attainment of justice than the complete absence
of reform would have been. It seems probable that that point has
already been reached in this instance. Progress towards a uniform
comparative fault standard seems no more likely than does the effective
clarification of the more rigid system of categorization.
A numerically less important applicatioi of the rule that contribu-
tory negligence is not a defense to actions not based on negligence is
presented in the absolute liability cases.62 A hasty analysis might lead
to the conclusion that this problem is essentially indistinguishable from
those raised by the various gradations of fault greater than negligence.
In fact, it is quite different. Absolute liability is simply a name applied
to various liabilities which, in widely differing types of cases, are
imposed without the necessity of finding negligence or any other type
of fault on the part of the defendant. Some of the instances of its
application are apparently the result of a feeling that the standards
which negligence rules impose are not sufficient safeguards against the
dangers of certain types of conduct. Typical of these are the dynamite
cases.63  Others represent a middle point between ordinary negligence
cases and those like workmen's compensation cases in which some social
policy has dictated consideration of elements other than the relationship
of the parties to the precise circumstances of the injury. Liability of
principals for agents' torts can be classified here.6 4  Others still are
6o. See note 59 supra.
61. See Note, Negligence-The Determination of Existence of Gross Negligence
Making Automobile Host Liable to Non-Paying Guest (1937) 35 MICH. L. Rfv. 804,
for some account of the effects of the Massachusetts and Michigan acts. Cf. Mole and
Wilson, supra note I at 625-628.
62. Lynch v. McNally, 73 N. Y. 347 (1878). See generally, HARPER, TORTS
(I933) § 152; Harper, Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause (1932) 30 MICH.
L. REv 1o2..
63. For a list and analysis of ultra-hazardous activities so treated see, RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS (1938) §§519-523.
64. This group of cases is not, of course, ordinarily classified among those im-
posing "absolute" liability. That liability is imposed without the necessity of finding
actual fault on the part of the defendant, however, is a commonplace of agency law.
This doctrine seems to be a step towards transferring to a group the loss which
unavoidably follows carrying on business in a given way. That it constitutes a satis-
factory method of solving the problem may be doubted. See note 16 supra for com-
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explainable only by an appeal to history, like trespassing animal cases, 65
and, finally, some seem impossible to explain at all. Fletcher v.
Rylands 16 occupies this niche in the writer's mind.
6"
Analogy to the recklessness and wilfulness cases might be argued
as a basis for refusing the defense in the first group, but with doubtful
exactness. It is probably true that this category of liability is actually
based on fault-a very high degree of fault verging on that character-
ized as intentionality. Thus it may be said that dynamite is so danger-
ous a substance that a prudent user must know he will be likely to inflict
injury no matter how careful he is.6 It then is easy to say that he
must recompense those injured so long as they do not make his task
of protecting them unduly difficult. But it would seem to be an open
question whether he must necessarily take added precautions to avoid
the effects of substandard conduct on the part of his neighbors.69 And
nothing in the doctrine tells us why the question has been decided as
it has.
Explanation by an analogy to the rather questionable doctrine that
even consent will not bar actions for injuries caused by conduct which
is thought highly antisocial fails, because dynamiting is nothing like the
types of conduct so treated but, on the contrary, is generally thought
socially beneficial. 7" A better explanation-if not justification-may
be that contributory negligence is not an appealing doctrine at best and
will not be applied where there is any pretext for avoiding it. This, of
course, offers as great an opportunity for unfairness to the defendant
as contributory negligence at its worst does for the plaintiff. Again,
ment on the availability of liability without fault as a remedy in situations where
community interest demands some solution other than that afforded by the negligence
concept.
65. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §§ 504, 505.
66. L. R. i Ex. :65 (1866).
67. But see Bohlen, The Rile in Rylands v. Fletcher, (Igi) 59 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 298, 373, 423. Cf. HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 14 at 116-117.
68. This seems to be the basis of the Restatenurnt rule. RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(1938) § 519.
69. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (938) § 524, which precludes only plaintiffs whose
negligence aids in the miscarriage of the activity and those with knowledge, not of
its danger, but of the fact that it is about to miscarry. Possibly the explanation lies
in the similarity of the dynamite cases to those in which liability is imposed upon
possessors of dangerous animals. But in the latter cases, the utility of the enter-
prise is undoubtedly thought significant. Id. at §§ 5o6, 507, 509, 518. The possessor
of an abnormally gentle bear is absolutely liable. The possessor of a normally dan-
gerous bull is not. Comparison of the actual danger involved in the respective activ-
ities is not determinative of liability. It is the social utility of the enterprise which
tips the balance. However irrelevant this factor might seem to the process of com-
pensating the plaintiff (see note I6 supra), it is extremely difficult to understand
why it has not been carried over into the blasting cases to the extent of allowing
the defense of contributory negligence generally. (See note 71 infra.) It is possible
that the rules applicable to participants and those coming into danger with notice are
expanding to this point. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (938) § 523.
70. This explanation would also be objectionable on the basis discussed at length
above that if "anti-social" means anything broader than "likely to harm the
plaintiff", adversary litigation is not the place to seek out and apply the remedy re-
quired by the relevant social policy. See note i6 supra.
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the result of failing to give 6pen recognition to comparative fault is
the cause of probable failure uniformly to achieve its ends. Even more
true is this of the second category of absolute liability. One could be
almost certain that plaintiffs would frequently be unduly favored from
a comparative fault viewpoint if contributory negligence were no de-
fense to the principal who responds for his agent's wrongs. But
apparently because this category of liability has been kept distinct from
others characterized as absolute, the defense is here allowed. The fatal
results of classification are evident in the third category, however.
That liability for trespassing animals is absolute is an historical relic
in any case. That contributory negligence is no defense seems a pure
anomaly, although a tenderness for landowners inherited from an
earlier day in English law may aid in explaining it. Finally, a refusal
to permit the defense in the Fletcher v. Rylands situation presents the
hardest problem of all. If this refusal is settled law,71 nothing would
seem to explain it other than the observation that since the reason for
liability in such cases is unknown, its limits are equally obscure.
If the purely verbal logic of the proposition that contributory
negligence is a defense only to actions based on negligence is disre-
garded, then, it is apparent that the refusal to permit it in the absolute
liability cases is difficult of convincing explanation. Not a little of this
difficulty arises from the absence of a satisfactory rationale for some
of the types of absolute liability themselves. But even where the outline
of that rationale may be discerned, it affords little justification for
refusal to permit the defense, assuming that the defense itself is satis-
factory and desirable within the scope attributed to it by traditional
doctrine. If, as it is believed, there is in this tangle an observable trend
towards comparative fault, it seems apparent that the necessity for
working in the dark toward that end has here resulted in some over-
compensation for the injustices plaintiffs have suffered at the hands of
contributory negligence in other fields.
Problems similar to those raised by refusal of the defense in
absolute liability cases may appear under the perplexed doctrine of
nuisance. Where nuisance arises from negligence, it has properly been
said that differentiation from other negligence cases would be logically
insupportable.72 But, in the so-called absolute nuisance cases, more
doubt arises.73 Without entering into extended analysis here, 74 it may
71. The extreme variations in what is usually regarded as a unitary rule may
well result in distinctions on this point. The trespassing and dangerous animal cases
need not be analogized. Indeed, analogy to the more limited liability of possessors
of domestic animals not known to be abnormally dangerous seems equally available.
Cf. HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 152.
72. McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 16o N. E. 391 (1928).
73. See cases collected in Note (1928) 57 A. L. R. 7.
74. See Notes (1935) 23 CALIF. L. Ray. 427; (934) 29 ILL L. REV. 372.
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be said that the complex mazes of absolute nuisance seem to include
cases corresponding to each of the categories of absolute liability dis-
cussed above and also some where the position of the plaintiff is the
determining circumstance, as in private nuisance situations, Any gen-
eral statement that contributory negligence is not a defense to all of
these types of absolute nuisance is probably too broad, 7" But to say
that the utmost confusion pervades the whole question of its applica-
bility is certainly justified, And, as in the absolute liability categories,
there is more than a suspicion that even-handed injustice is being done
by a wholly capricious system of favoring, now an undeserving plaintiff
and now a defendant no more worthy, by reason of the confusion which
results from the refusal openly to compare their faults.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt solutions for the
problems of these tangential fields. It is quite possible that some of
them would remain if the confusing factor of contributory negligence
and the covert reactions against it were removed. Thus the absolute
liability and nuisance categories might continue to be baffling in any
event. But it is hard to doubt that solutions for all of these problems
would be greatly simplified by clarification of the contributory negli-
gence situation, and that some of them would entirely disappear,
Their genuine significance here, however, is that they point to the
central difficulty of contributory negligence. Each has been used as an
avenue of escape from the essential unfairness of that doctrine in its
accepted form. Yet none of them has proved satisfactory for the
purpose. By devious and uneven methods they have made an approach
to comparative fault by attempting to avoid refusing recovery to a
plaintiff whose conduct appears somehow less culpable than that of the
defendant although not entirely blameless, At least three elements have
combined to obscure and hamper this process. First is the failure
sufficiently to limit the stated function of the negligence concept, a
failure which, as has been pointed out above, has tended excessively to
sanctify its present form and that of its attendant doctrines, To this
underlying source of difficulty is added a second which arises largely
from the first, the refusal to acknowledge the propriety of considering
comparative fault at all, The extent to which this has led to unac-
knowledged evasions with accompanying difficulties of analysis and
contradictory results has been suggested above. The final obstructive
element, however, seldom appears on the surface at all, yet is, perhaps,
the most important reason why no rational solution for any of the above
problems has yet been reached or is even in prospect. The development
of various fields of the common law toward unacknowledged ends by
75. Cf. HARPER, ToRTs (I933) § 153.
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indirection is a process so familiar and so frequently successful that
any criticism based merely on the proposition that such a process was
going on and had not yet reached perfection could justifiably be disre-
garded. Thus the two obstructive elements already referred to could
be dismissed with the statement that the uneven and obscure revision of
the contributory negligence rules toward comparative fault is no suffi-
cient cause for concern. Even where the process has reached an
apparent impasse because of the very complexity of the methods by
which it is carried on, as in the categorization of degrees of fault, the
ultimate discovery of some satisfactory detour or short-cut might
confidently be expected.
But the third and a fundamental objection remains. It is the fact
that the end towards which this process tends is in itself unsatisfactory.
The groupings toward comparative fault are an attempt to cure only
the most obvious injustice of contributory negligence. At the maximum
they can aspire only to the elimination of situations in which the plain-
tiff is less at fault than the defendant and still is denied recovery.
Admitting the premise that one or the other must bear the whole loss,
no more can be done. No one's sense of fairness would countenance
permitting a plaintiff who was the more at fault to foist the entire loss
onto the defendant.
76
But why must that premise be admitted? So long as it stands, the
attempted cure for the unfairness inherent in contributory negligence
will be of necessity only a shade less bad than the disease. The only
alternative to leaving the plaintiff uncompensated for an injury in which
the defendant admittedly participated is to saddle the defendant with
the entire cost of what the plaintiff helped him do. In the multitudes
of cases where varying degrees of responsibility lie with each party, it
is small wonder that the boundary between these two results is gerry-
mandered. That this situation should force judges into unacknowl-
edged devices for striking a finer balance of comparative fault than is
permitted by traditional doctrine is less surprising than their failure to
recognize that refinements in the method of determining comparative
fault are, when applied to impose the whole loss upon one party, simply
more accurate methods of arriving at a wrong result. The tendency of
juries, already noted, to find compromise verdicts despite all efforts to
prevent them from doing so would seem to indicate that their percep-
tions are the less hampered by legal verbiage.
76. The real objection to the "Humanitarian Rule" is that it is subject to sus-
picion of doing exactly that. Its adoption is probably the reflection of a feeling that
inadvertence in carrying on certain highly dangerous activities is worse than the
failure on the part of the victim to guard against injury by them. But open ex-
pression of that feeling is precluded except in the absolute liability cases. The re-
sult is a subterfuge which satisfies no one.
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III
These observations are not novel. It has been pointed out else-
where 77 that the pull to escape the injustice to the plaintiff wrought by
rigid application of contributory negligence rules results in injustice to
the defendant; that while a delusion of fairness may be created by
averaging out the results and finding that plaintiffs in general are
favored about as often as defendants in general, there are in fact no
plaintiffs or defendants in general, but only individual litigants each
of whom is the recipient of unjust burden or undue favor in his own
particular controversy. The homely observation that two wrongs do
not make a right could find no better illustration.
The solution of the difficulty similarly lacks novelty. Some forms
of loss distribution have existed very nearly as long as the problem
itself.78 Many different forms have been suggested or actually put
into operation at varying times and places and for varying purposes.
The most accurate of them may be rejected out of hand. Rigid logical
analysis of causation and the full utilization of the findings of psychol-
ogy and other sciences might suggest that the loss arising from a given
accident should not be divided between two parties only but distributed
over a wide range of individuals and even inanimate factors. But the
mere prospect of attempting to allocate the expenses of Brown's injuries
at the hands of Kendall in the course of the latter's efforts to end a dog
fight among those responsible for the deficient training of the dogs, the
dogs themselves, those upon whom a phychologist might place respon-
sibility for the respective mental states of the parties, and low visibility
-to mention only a few of the myriad possible factors-is sufficient to
demonstrate the hopelessness of attempting any such distribution within
the adversary system of litigation.79  Further, such a distribution would
undoubtedly fail to satisfy current popular standards of fairness.
At the other extreme stands the arbitrary division of loss between
the parties on some fixed basis. This has the merit of simplicity in
administration; and giving a badly injured plaintiff who was only
slightly negligent fifty per cent. of his loss; this is fifty per cent. better
than nothing. But it may also be forty-nine per cent. short of a fair
solution. 0 Perfection cannot be expected of the admittedly rough and
ready system we are examining. Half a loaf may be better than none.
But such a method should not be adopted if a better is available.
77. Lowndes, note 12 supra at 708-709. See also, GRaFoRy, LEGISLATIVE Loss
DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE AcTioNs (1936) 52.
78. A comprehensive analysis of these may be found in Mole and Wilson, note I
supra at 604.
79. Cf. Cowan, note 27 supra at 67 and Cowan, note IO supra at 539.
8o. Comparative negligence and loss cannot, of course, be expressed in exact
percentages. But this method of relation offers a convenient form of illustrative
shorthand.
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Between the two methods suggested stands the one which makes
comparative fault a basis for reduction in the plaintiff's damages pro
tanto. It has been said of this that "the task of apportioning damages
according to the respective contributions of the plaintiff and defendant
. . . is an undertaking which . . . cannot be performed accurately
by any human agency". 8' With this one readily agrees. Equally valid
is the statement by the same authority that "it seems impossible to
evolve any formulae which will produce even an approximately accurate
apportionment in a large run of cases". 82 Illustration of these diffi-
culties seems superfluous. But are these objections sufficient to con-
demn the method altogether? Need we be sure of accuracy or accept-
able formula before preferring this type of loss distribution to what we
now have? The ideal method of determining the merits of the two
methods would, of course, be an appeal to experience. This is unfor-
tunately impossible. There is no way of knowing, in any positive sense,
either how bad the results of present systems are nor how good are
those obtained in experience with the proposed reform where it has
been tried. As to the former, one must reason from the rather scat-
tered and remote indicia noted above. The teaching of experience
under the reformed system is encouraging, but almost wholly nega-
tive. 83 It can be said with confidence that no cataclysms have attended
the application of various types of loss distribution. Juries have not
failed to function at all under these rules, nor have judges been so
unable to guide their functioning that the legal system has been
hampered in its operation. Nor is popular reaction so unfavorable as
to create any observable demand for their abandonment.
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Beyond these findings, the lack-and impossibility-of statistical
information about the actual results of litigation under any system
necessitates reliance on sheer a priori reasoning in dealing with the
problem. The problem is: would application of comparative loss dis-
tribution reach results more closely approximating the popular concep-
tion of fairness or justice in individual litigations than does the present
doctrine of contributory negligence together with all its satellite doc-
trines varied as they now are by the behavior of juries? What now
governs these cases is the purported rule that a plaintiff who has been
negligent in the slightest degree cannot recover from a defendant who
is less than grossly negligent, who is not liable without fault or for
absolute nuisance and who had no last clear chance. Varying that rule
is a confused tangle of exceptions and overlapping rules-statutory
81. Lowndes, note 12 supra at 683.
82. Id. at 683-684. It is assumed that by "formuhe" this statement means spe-
cific criteria of comparison.
83. See Mole and Wilson, note i supra at 633-655.
84. Ibid.
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and judge-made alike-which approach to greater or less degree the
outlawed doctrine of comparative negligence,85 giving complete victory
to one party or the other after a more refined analysis of responsibility.
Finally, there is the hidden rebellion on the part of some juries in
favor of the loss distribution system, working erratically and in
unknown proportions toward what results we cannot say.
To such a system, if system it can be called, objections are legion.
It is at best unjust, even if it achieves uniformly the result of compara-
tive negligence. It almost certainly does not do even that very well.
Within the interstices of its contradictions and confusions even greater
injustices may be and probably are multiplied. It requires an ever-
expanding series of rules of law to restrain its own vagaries and those
of juries who find in it no guide to intelligent judgment.
What is proposed is that juries be permitted to work out by the
exercise of their understanding of the popular standards of fairness a
distribution of loss between the two parties before them. The chief
objection is that juries are not to be trusted so far. This may be broken
down into two separate ideas. First a general distrust of juries which
fosters a preferende for leaving a large measure of control with the
judge to be exercised by "rules of law"; and second, the belief that the
problem is incapable of solution by anyone and hence not by a jury.
The two should be dealt with separately.
There is undoubtedly much reason for distrust in juries. Their
emotions frequently sway their judgment. And there is reason to
suspect that they quite generally fail to understand and follow any but
the simplest rules laid down for their guidance or any but relatively
simple fact situations. Any reform in negligence law short of one sup-
planting juries by a body of broadly qualified experts must be viewed
with this attribute in mind. From this point of view, the proposed
system of distribution of loss seems not worse but better than what we
have. At present, the function of rules of law in cases where negligence
is alleged as to both parties is to lay down a series of barriers the sole
purpose of which is to prevent the jury from doing what its natural
instincts dictate. They must not compare the conduct of the parties
for the purpose of fixing liability or determining its proportional
incidence upon them. Instead they must listen attentively to descrip-
tions of the state of law upon negligence, contributory negligence, and,
in a growing number of cases, last clear chance, and find their way out
85. In Illinois, the pure comparative fault doctrine was followed for some years,
forcing defendant to pay for the entire injury so long as his fault was greater than
that of plaintiff. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. R. v. Todd. 36 Ill. 409 (1865) ; Galena
& Chicago U. R. R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (858). With its disappearance in this
state-see Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin, i5 Ill. 358 (1885)-overt comparison
of fault substantially disappeared. See for comment on this doctrine, COOLEY, TORTS
(4th ed. 1932) §485.
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of the resulting maze as best they can. Even assuming that the intricate
legal doctrines thus presented to them are perfect instruments for the
accurate allocation of liability, it seems evident that their very complex-
ity is a fertile field for the growth of the very faults for which the jury
is already condemned. If distrust of juries arises from their inability
to follow close and intricate legal reasoning, the cure is not to be found
in our present tendency to concoct increasingly complex limitations on
their activity which, in the last analysis, they must understand and
apply. Simplification of rules and utilization of the jury's natural
predilections wherever possible is surely a more practical method of
preventing the increase of uncontrolled vagaries in their conduct.
The second objection-that the task itself is impossible-seems no
more persuasive. Of course it is impossible to allocate damages accu-
rately between two negligent parties. The impossibility of laying down
accurate and detailed rules for the performance of this impossible task
is even more apparent. But these propositions seem to offer no basis
for the supposition that worse results will be reached by permitting
juries to attempt a fair and rational solution than by forcing upon them
complicated rules the purpose of which is to coerce them into reaching
one which is unfair and irrational.
It is submitted that better results can probably be obtained by
entrusting to the good sense of juries-limited as it may be-the task
of making as fair an apportionment as they can than by entrusting to
the nonsense of the present rules of contributory negligence the task of
seeing to it that no fair apportionment be permitted. The function of
juries in our law is precisely the performance of the impossible in any
event,"' and this task seems to be an impossibility quite as much within
their competence as others which they now perform. A certain amount
of guidance would, of course, be required. It seems quite likely that
such directions as are given the jury under the Wisconsin rule 87 or
the Ontario statute 88 would be at least as effective both for guidance
and as a basis for review as the enormously complex dissertations now
require. Ultimately, it might be expected that degrees of negligence
would be worked out, not as a result of rules imposed by appellate
courts after discovery by a priori reasoning, but by the gradual process
86. See British Phosphates and Beef Extract Ltd. v. The United Alkali and
Guano Simplex Ass'n, HERBERT, UNcOMMON LAW (1936) 209. No lawyer can seri-
ously believe that juries actually discover the precise facts underlying any given con-
troversy. It is a patent impossibility even in the simplest cases. Indeed, the very
existence of "facts" as they are sought in negligence cases is highly doubtful. See
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) 170-185.
87. Wis. Laws, 1931, c. 242, Wis. STAT. § 331.045. See 4 WIS. STATE BAR ASS'N
BULL. 232-236; Mole and Wilson, note I supra at 651.
88. Ontario Laws, 1924, c. 32. Note that this act provides for arbitrary division
of damages where comparison is impracticable. See for a discussion of decisions under
this act, MacIntyre, note 30 supra at 1241-1251.
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of experience and observation on the part of nisi prius judges who
would be in direct contact with juries and the operation of the new
doctrine upon large quantities of cases. This is the traditional method
of developing standards described by Holmes.89 And if to evoke its
efficient functioning the slate must be wiped clean of inconsistent prece-
dent, it should be done.90 If it is not, the rigidity of the existing rules
may soon be supplanted by the greater rigidity attendant upon statutory
reform-an eventuality which is neither necessary nor desirable within
the area of relatively isolated accidents as to which no clear social policy
yet exists. The gradual evolution of judicial legislation here has its
most obvious utility. It should be given the opportunity to function.
89. HOLmEs, op. cit. supra note 14 at 121-129.
go. Id. at 125-126. ". . . these considerations only lead to the conclusion that
precedents should be overruled when they become inconsistent with present condi-
tions . . . " Cf. Mr. Justice Stone, The Common Law in the United States (1936)
50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 7-12.
